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The Perlman Exception: Limitations
Required By The Final Decision Rule
Section 1291 of the Judicial Code allows appeal to the courts
of appeals "from all final decisions of the district courts of the
United States."1 Orders compelling testimony before grand juries
or denying motions to quash subpoenas to appear before grand ju-
ries are not final decisions and therefore are not immediately ap-
pealable. Subpoenaed parties must either comply with these or-
ders or resist them, inviting a contempt citation. The contempt
sanction is an immediately appealable final decision,3 thus provid-
ing witnesses a route for prompt review of ordinarily nonappeala-
ble, interlocutory orders.'
The Perlman exception5 to this general rule gives a third-
party intervenor claiming a constitutional, statutory, or common
law privilege in subpoenaed information the right to immediate ap-
peal because he is not in a position to be cited for contempt. This
exception provides that where a subpoenaed party will not risk a
contempt citation to render an intervenor's claim appealable, and
the intervenor thus will lose any meaningful opportunity to have
the claim reviewed, a court's refusal to quash a grand jury sub-
poena may be deemed an appealable final decision under section
1291.6
The Supreme Court continues to endorse the Perlman excep-
tion in dicta without much guidance as to its precise scope,7 and
the circuits disagree on the breadth of the exception. Most apply it
2 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
2United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, 309
U.S. 323, 325 (1940); Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 121 (1906).
3 United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971). The proceedings may be stayed until
the appeal is completed. Lowthian v. United States, 575 F.2d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam). See 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976) (court should expedite appeal from contempt order).
' See Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 121-22 (1906) (recognizing review
through contempt citation).
5 The exception derives its name from Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918).
6Typically, the subpoenaed party initially seeks to quash the subpoena, claiming that
the information sought is protected by his own and the intervenor's privileges. If the court
issues an order denying the subpoenaed party's motion to quash, the intervenor may for-
mally intervene, has standing to file and appeal, and may assert the privilege in his own
right. The Perlman exception governs this appeal.
7 The most recent endorsement was in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691 (1974).
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liberally to a variety of situations,8 but a distinct minority limits
its application.9
After reviewing the policies underlying section 1291 and com-
paring the Perlnan exception with other exceptions to the final
decision rule,10 this comment proposes a framework for applying
the Perlnan exception. Using this framework, the comment then
analyzes typical situations in which intervenors seek to invoke the
exception. The analysis demonstrates the undesirability of a
wholesale expansion of the exception, and the comment concludes
that the congressional directive in section 1291 and the need to
protect appellate courts from burdensome interlocutory appeals
compel a narrow reading of the Perlman exception.
I. THE Perlman ExCEPTION
A. The Final Decision Rule
In enacting section 1291, Congress determined that the con-
cerns of a litigant seeking immediate review of an interlocutory or-
der are not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the importance of
conserving judicial resources and avoiding interruptions in judicial
proceedings."' Applying this congressional directive, the Supreme
8 Most notable are the Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 655 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1981) (client-intervenor, claiming attorney-client privi-
lege, may invoke Perlman exception to appeal an order denying motion to quash grand jury
subpoena issued to attorney); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 641 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1981)
(same); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1979) (same); United States v.
RMI Co., 599 F.2d 1183 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d 589 (3d Cir.
1978); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1977).
9 Most notable are the District of Columbia, First, and Second Circuits. See, e.g., In re
Sealed Case, 655 F.2d 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (client-intervenor, claiming attorney-client and
work product privileges, may not invoke the Perlman exception to appeal an order denying
motion to quash grand jury subpoena issued to attorney); In re Oberkoetter, 612 F.2d 15
(1st Cir. 1980) (same, except cient-intervenor asserted only attorney-client privilege); Na-
tional Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 591 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1979) (em-
ployer-intervenor, claiming governmental privilege, may not use Perlnan exception to ap-
peal an order denying motion to quash grand jury subpoena issued to employee).
'0 Although sometimes termed the "final judgment" rule, see Frank, Requiem for the
Final Judgment Rule, 45 Tax. L. Rav. 292 (1966), section 1291 refers to decisions, not
judgments.
n1 See New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1304, 1305 (1978) (Marshall, J., in
chambers) (noting strong congressional policy of hastening ultimate disposition of litiga-
tion); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690 (1974) (finality requirement conserves judi-
cial resources by avoiding piecemeal appellate review). See also Crick, The Final Judgment
as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932) (history of the rule's common law back-
ground); Frank, supra note 10, at 292 ("In the federal system the requirement of a final
judgment for appellate review was incorporated in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and has been
carried forth, with some specified exceptions, in every subsequent revision of the judicial
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Court has ruled that to obtain immediate review of orders in crimi-
nal or civil actions compelling testimony or production of evidence,
a subpoenaed witness must be prepared to disobey the order and
suffer a contempt citation.12
The harshness of the choice between compliance and con-
tempt cannot be denied. If the witness suffers contempt to perfect
an appeal, he remains a contemnor, subject to imprisonment or
fine, unless the appellate court quashes the subpoena.13 By impos-
ing this difficult choice on the witness contemplating an appeal,
however, the rule maintains efficient judicial administration, pre-
vents unnecessary delays, and guards against circumvention of sec-
tion 1291's finality requirement.1
4
code.").
Conditioning appealability on a final decision serves other purposes. Consolidating re-
view of all the issues of a case in a single, comprehensive proceeding may foster better-
informed decisions. See, e.g., Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 178
(1955); Heike v. United States, 217 U.S. 423, 428-29 (1910); McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661,
665-66 (1891); 9 J. Mooma, B. WARD & J. LucAs, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.07, at
107-11 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as MooRa's FEDERAL PRAcrica]. The finality require-
ment of section 1291 respects the role of trial judges in determining the myriad legal and
factual issues arising during trial. Such determinations will be accorded deference on appeal.
See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981).
"2 United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, 309
U.S. 323, 325 (1940); Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 121 (1906).
IS The Supreme Court's decisions formulating the rule requiring the witness's submis-
sion to a contempt citation have failed to indicate whether the citation would be criminal or
civil. Contempt proceedings cannot be characterized as strictly criminal or civil within the
ordinary meaning of those terms. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1924).
Courts must classify the contempt citation, however, because the criminal contemnor is pro-
tected by constitutional guarantees that are unavailable to the civil contemnor. See Kuhns,
The Summary Contempt Power: A Critique and a New Prospective, 88 YALE L.J. 39 (1978).
The classification usually depends on the purpose of the citation. The purpose of civil
contempt is to coerce the witness into complying with the court's order. The penalty, either
fine or imprisonment, is terminable upon the contemnor's compliance with the order. In
other words, civil contemnors "carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets." In re
Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902). Criminal contempt, on the other hand, is designed to
punish the contemnor who flouts the court's order. See, e.g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911). The penalty is imprisonment for a fixed term, and,
unlike civil contemnors, criminal contemnors cannot purge themselves by complying with
the court's order. Id. at 442-43.
In practice, nonparty witnesses who suffer contempt to perfect appeals are cited for
civil contempt. See, e.g., National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 591
F.2d 174, 180 (2d Cir. 1979). The court achieves the aim of forcing compliance by threaten-
ing civil fines, which continue until the witness complies, the grand jury is dismissed, or the
witness prevails on appeal. Criminal contempt is inappropriate for nonparty witnesses be-
cause it would eliminate any ongoing incentive for the witness to comply with the subpoena.
14 United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971). Accord, Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S.
449, 460 (1975); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1974). See also DiBella v.
United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124 (1962) (Frankfurter, J.) ("This insistence on finality and
prohibition of piecemeal review discourages undue litigiousness and leaden-footed adminis-
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B. The Perlman Exception
In Perlman v. United States,16 the Supreme Court created an
exception to the rule requiring a contempt citation to perfect an
appeal. The facts were unusual. Perlman deposited his papers and
models with the clerk of the district court as exhibits in a patent
infringement suit brought by his company. Later the district court,
on application of the United States Attorney, directed the clerk to
produce the exhibits for presentation to a grand jury that was in-
vestigating charges that Perlnan had perjured himself in the pat-
ent suit. 6 Claiming fourth and fifth amendment privileges in the
exhibits,1 7 Perlman unsuccessfully petitioned to restrain their pre-
sentation to the grand jury.1 8 The government moved to dismiss
Perlman's appeal of this ruling, arguing that because the district
court's order was part of an ongoing proceeding, it was interlocu-
tory and therefore not appealable. 1"
The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that Perlman's
ability to protect his constitutional privileges would be thwarted if
he could not appeal the district court's ruling. Because Perlman
was powerless to prevent disclosure and to "avoid the mischief of
the [production] order," the Court held the order "final" for pur-
poses of appeal.20
Subsequent Court decisions initially interpreted Perlman to
permit appeals of interlocutory orders where the petitioner's mo-
tration of justice, particularly damaging to the conduct of criminal cases."); Cobbledick v.
United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.). See also 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE, supra note 11, 1 110, § 1312], at 155:
Sufferance of a contempt conviction is a desperate remedy, but no less desperate is the
disease that the remedy was designed to relieve. Litigation cannot go on if those in-
volved are allowed to interrupt it with impunity to take appeals that are usually fore-
doomed to failure. The issues raised by such appeals have been committed by Congress
and the Federal Rules to the discretion of the district courts. For patent abuse of dis-
cretion, or to settle "new and important problems" respecting the power of the district
court, mandamus is available.
15 247 U.S. 7 (1918).
See Perlman Rim Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 244 F. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
17 247 U.S. at 13.
is In light of current jurisprudence on fourth amendment standing- requirements, it is
doubtful that Perlman would be able to raise his fourth amendment claim today. See Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
1, 247 U.S. at 13.
20 Id. The Court rejected Perman's arguments on the merits, holding that because he
had voluntarily produced the exhibits to his advantage as part of his testimony in an earlier
patent suit, he suffered no invasion of his fourth and fifth amendment privileges. Id. at 15.
In other words, Perlman had no basis for arguing that the district court's subpoena consti-
tuted an "unreasonable seizure" or "forced compulsory" self-incriminating testimony.
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tion to quash was independent of the pending proceeding.21 The
Perlman exception eventually was narrowed to allow an intervenor
claiming an interest in the subpoenaed information to appeal the
denial of his motion to quash that subpoena, where the subpoe-
naed party could not be expected to risk contempt to perfect an
appeal.22 This narrowing also involved a subtle shift in the un-
derlying explanation for the exception. In Cobbledick v. United
States,2" the Court in 1940 emphasized the impossibility of later
review as the reason for allowing Perlman to appeal. When the
Court resurrected the Perlman exception in the 1970'S,24 however,
it emphasized as the reason for allowing appeal the uncertainty of
having the subpoenaed party risk contempt to aid the intervenor."
Besides these intermittent endorsements of the Perlman ex-
ception, the Court has not provided concrete guidelines for its ap-
plication. It is unclear whether the exception applies to both con-
stitutional and nonconstitutional claims of intervenors," and it is
22 See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 356 (1931) (citing Perl-
man for the proposition that if the district court's order was not made in, or dependent on,
any pending case or proceeding, the order was appealable); Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S.
221, 225 (1929) (Perlman conferred appealability on the interlocutory order because of the
independence of Perlman's motion to quash from the criminal proccedings involving the
perjury charges).
2 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691 (1974); United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S.
530, 533 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 328-29 (1940).
23 309 U.S. 323, 328-29 (1940).
24 Perlman had to be "resurrected" because of the Court's decision in DiBella v. United
States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962). In that case, the Court held that appeals from orders granting
or denying pre-indictment motions were not appealable. Id. at 131. The Court's broad lan-
guage signalled the preclusion of a Perlman-type appeal. See National Super Spuds, Inc. v.
New York Mercantile Exch., 591 F.2d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J.) (DiBella spelled
"the doom of Perlman'. As Judge Friendly has pointed out, however, "predictions of Perl-
man's demise would have been as exaggerated as those of Mark Twain's." Id. In United
States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 537 (1971), the Court approved Perlman as one decision in a
"limited class of cases" where denial of immediate review would render impossible any re-
view whatsoever of an individual's claim, so that an exception to the final decision rule was
necessary. The Court's most recent affirmation of Perlman came in United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 691 (1974).
15 See United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971).
26 Perlman involved a constitutional claim. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying
text. In Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 328-29 (1940), Justice Frankfurter cited
Perlman's constitutional claim as a factor in the Court's decision. In United States v. Ryan,
402 U.S. 530 (1971), however, the Court did not highlight the constitutional nature of Perl-
man's claim, possibly minimizing its significance. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974), the Court cited Perlnan as involving simply "a claim of privilege," again without
distinguishing among constitutional, statutory, and common law privileges. Id. at 691. In the
Court's latest message, Justice Marshall read -Perlman as allowing appeals so that the peti-
tioner could assert its "constitutional objections" to the subpoena. Eastland v. United
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 514 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Although the First Circuit has argued that the Perlman exception applies only to con-
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also unclear to what extent the relationship between the intervenor
and the subpoenaed party determines the scope of the exception.
C. Exceptions to the Final Decision Rule: Alternatives to
Perlman
Congress and the Supreme Court have created additional ex-
ceptions to the finality requirement to mitigate its sometimes
harsh results. These other exceptions, however, do not guarantee
the third-party intervenor in a Perlman-type situation an immedi-
ate, nondiscretionary review of his claim.
For example, the Interlocutory Appeals Act,27 codified at sec-
tion 1292(b) of the Judicial Code, permits trial judges to certify for
appeal orders in civil actions that involve "controlling question[s]
of law" when an immediate appeal may "materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation." Some courts have certified
for appeal orders involving grand jury subpoenas where appellants
would otherwise be precluded from asserting claims of privilege
until an appeal after trial.2 8 Unlike appeals under the Perlman ex-
stitutional claims, see In re Oberkoetter, 612 F.2d 15, 18 (lst Cir. 1980), the argument is
unpersuasive because nonconstitutional privileges deserve and receive the same protection
as their constitutional counterparts in other contexts. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings, 601 F.2d 162, 169 (5th Cir. 1979) (rule protecting witnesses from surrendering constitu-
tional privileges extended to include common law and statutory privileges).
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). In relevant part, this section provides:
When a district judge ... shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termina-
tion of the litigation, he shall so state in writing... . The Court of Appeals may there-
upon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order.
2S See, e.g., United States v. Bonnell, 483 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Minn. 1979) (certifying
under section 1292(b) questions whether document subpoenaed by grand jury was privileged
attorney-client communication or attorney's work product and whether subpoena violated
intervenor's fifth amendment rights); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 338 F. Supp. 1379
(W.D. Pa. 1972) (certifying under section 1292(b) question whether documents subpoenaed
by grand jury were privileged under the fifth amendment). But see In re Oswalt, 607 F.2d
645 (5th Cir. 1979) (absent certification by district court, denial of motion to quash grand
jury subpoena is not appealable under section 1292(b)); In re April 1977 Grand Jury Sub-
poenas, 584 F.2d 1366 (6th Cir. 1978) (district court's order relating to grand jury criminal
proceeding not appealable under section 1292(b) because such a proceeding not a "civil ac-
tion" within the Act), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 934 (1979).
Outside of the grand jury context, some courts have permitted parties under section
1292(b) to appeal motions to quash subpoenas seeking allegedly privileged information. See,
e.g., Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970) (remanding appeal under section
1292(b) involving corporation's claim of attorney-client privilege against plaintiff-stockhold-
ers for consideration whether good cause for disclosure of privileged information existed),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). But see SEC v. Canadian Javelin, Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 594
(D.D.C. 1978) (court's order denying corporation's motion to quash subpoena on basis of
attorney-client privilege not certified under section 1292(b) because interlocutory appeal on
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ception, however, appeals under section 1292(b) are discretionary '
and limited to situations where interlocutory review might prevent
protracted and expensive litigation.3 0
Other exceptions to the final decision rule also are often inade-
quate substitutes for the Perlman exception. In the grand jury
context, a writ of mandamus$' can be issued only where a district
judge engages in such "extraordinary" abuse of power that "justice
requires immediate review. '82 And the collateral order exception to
section 1291,3 which several courts have used to grant immediate
the privilege question would cause further undue delay).
29 The district court has complete discretion whether to certify the question for appeal.
American Bar Ass'n, Report of Special Comm. on Fed. Rules of Procedure, 38 F.R.D. 95,
104 (1965); Gellhorn & Larsen, Interlocutory Appeal Procedures in Administrative Hear-
ings, 70 MICH. L. Rnv. 109, 137 (1971) ("District courts... have not been overly sympa-
thetic to claims of error. Neither have they been easily persuaded that the order involves a
'controlling question of law' or that immediate appeal will speed the final determination.")
(citations omitted). The courts of appeals can deny review of a certified question for any
reason, including congested dockets. Hearings on H.R. 6238 and H.R. 7260 Before Sub-
comm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1958) (state-
ment of Judge Marls).
30 S. REP. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Naws 5255, 5260. See Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), 88 HARv. L. Rzv. 607, 617-28 (1975).
Section 1292(b) applies only to "civil actions." The Sixth Circuit has held that a grand
jury proceeding is not a civil action under section 1292(b), basing its conclusion on the Su-
preme Court's decisions disapproving appellate interruption of the grand jury's investiga-
tions. In re April 1977 Grand Jury Subpoenas, 584 F.2d 1366, 1368-69 (6th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 934 (1979). Most courts, however, have labelled a grand jury proceeding a
"civil action" under section 1292(b). See, e.g., In re Oswalt, 607 F.2d 645, 648 (5th Cir.
1979); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 580 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 1978); In re Doe, 546 F.2d
498, 501-02 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 376 (3d
Cir. 1976); United States v. Bonnell, 483 F. Supp. 1091, 1093 (D. Minn. 1979).
I1 The writ is issued under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976).
2 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April, 1978, 581 F.2d 1103, 1107 (4th Cir. 1978) (deny-
ing petitioner's request for writ of mandamus directing district court to hold an evidentiary
hearing on the allegation that the grand jury process had been abused, arguing that peti-
tioner's interests were protected by F-D. R. CuM. P. 6(e), which eliminated the need for
extraordinary appellate relief), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979). Accord, In re Special
March 1974 Grand Jury, 541 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1977). See
also Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980) (per curiam) (writ should
"hardly ever" be granted to review otherwise interlocutory order); De Beers Consol. Mines,
Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945) (writ not issued for mere error but only when
court has no judicial power to do what it purports to do); Note, Supervisory and Advisory
Mandamus Under the All Writs Act, 86 HARv. L. RaV. 595 (1973). But see United States v.
United States Dist. Court, 238 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1956) (issuing mandamus directing district
court to modify order involving subpoenas for production of documents before grand jury),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 981 (1957).
33 This exception, announced in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949), provides for immediate appellate review of court orders that "conclusively determine
the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the
action and ... [are] effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment." Coopers &
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appeal to subpoenaed witnesses asserting a privilege in informa-
tion," has never been invoked to perfect the appeal of a third
party intervenor.3 5
H. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS: THE Perlnan EXCEPTmON AS A
CONTINUUM
Situations similar to the narrow facts of the Perlman case still
arise, as where an attorney moves to quash a grand jury subpoena
issued to a court clerk seeking the attorney's retainer agreements
on file with the court.8 6 During the 1970's, however, federal courts
dramatically expanded the reach of the Perlman exception on the
presumption that intervenors' rights usually would not be pro-
tected unless immediate review were granted.3 7 Courts have broad-
ened the exception to include employers' appeals of their motions
to quash grand jury subpoenas that were issued to their employ-
ees," clients' appeals of motions to quash grand jury subpoenas
issued to their attorneys,39 and bank depositors' appeals of their
motions to quash grand jury subpoenas issued to officials of the
bank.40
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
" See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.)
(per curiam) (appealing district court's order denying motion to retain documents acciden-
tally disclosed to Justice Department), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979); Socialist Worker's
Party v. Grubisic, 604 F.2d 1005 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (appeal by nonparty deponent
of court's order denying his motion to quash subpoena); Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil
Co., 340 F.2d 993 (10th Cir.) (appeal by nonparty witness of court's order denying motion to
quash subpoena), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 964 (1965). But see Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d
811 (2d Cir. 1976) (nonparty witness may not use collateral order doctrine to appeal denial
of motion to quash subpoena); United States v. Anderson, 464 F.2d 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(same).
35 See In re Sealed Case, 655 F.2d 1298, 1302 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (implicitly rejecting
application of the collateral order doctrine to third-party intervenors).
3 In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 376-77 (3d Cir. 1976).
27 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 641 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Berkley &
Co., 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 623 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1980);
In re November 1979 Grand Jury, 616 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings, 604 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1979).
" In re Grand Jury, 619 F.2d 1022, 1024-25 (3d Cir. 1980); see infra notes 55-59 and
accompanying text.
3, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 655 F.2d 882, 885 (8th Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 641 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1981); Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Parsons, 561 F.2d
671, 674 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978).
'I Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316, 316 (9th Cir. 1969); see also American Meat
Processors Ass'n v. United States, 561 F.2d 109, 110 n.2 (8th Cir. 1977) (appeal by trade
association members of denial of their motion to quash grand jury subpoena issued to fellow
association member seeking records allegedly privileged by first amendment associational
rights).
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Thus the Perlman exception, designed to apply to a "limited
class of cases, ' 41 has been expanded to cover a variety of situations
far different from the "unusual" 42  circumstances in Perlman.
Courts of appeals expanding the exception have enunciated no lim-
iting principles to prevent it from swallowing up the rule that con-
tempt is required to perfect immediate appeals.4 They have failed
to follow the Supreme Court's direction that in deciding questions
of finality, "the danger of denying justice by delay" must be bal-
anced against the "important competing considerations" of "'the
inconvenience and costs of piecemeal appeals.'-44 The policy
against piecemeal appeals has heightened significance in the grand
jury context, for grand juries cannot function properly if they are
constantly interrupted by appeals.'5 Where federal court dockets
In a unique line of cases, the Fifth Circuit has created a governmental privilege varia-
tion to the Perlman exception that arguably swallows up the contempt-to-perfect rule. In
Cates v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 480 F.2d 620, 622 (5th Cir. 1973), the court extended the
exception to allow the Department of the Navy, asserting an executive privilege in the sub-
poenaed information, to appeal the order to produce the information even though the order
was directed at the Department of the Navy itself. In effect, the court allowed the govern-
ment to appeal without suffering contempt, thus totally circumventing the contempt route
of appeal. See also Carr v. Monroe Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1000 (1971); Overby v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 224 F.2d 158, 162 (5th
Cir. 1955). The Fifth Circuit recently, though reluctantly, reaffirmed this variation. See
Branch v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 638 F.2d 873, 877-78 (5th Cir. 1981) (following Cates
although asserting that there is no reason to allow a governmental body to appeal a sub-
poena without contempt while requiring a private party to perfect the appeal by contempt).
For criticism of the Fifth Circuit's doctrine, see In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 607 F.2d 566,
571 (2d Cir. 1979) (Fifth Circuit's extension of Perlman implicitly rejects the contempt
route to appealability required by the Supreme Court).
41 United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971), quoted with approval in United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691 (1974).
42 National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 591 F.2d 174, 178 (2d Cir.
1979). One explanation for this expansion of the Perlman exception is Congress's enactment
of the "recalcitrant witness" statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976), which empowers federal
judges summarily to confine grand jury witnesses who refuse "without just cause" to comply
with a court's order. Once courts were given this power, witnesses and interested parties
would understandably try to avoid this punishment. Conceivably, the Perlman exception
was expanded to circumvent this penalty, allowing both the subpoenaed party and the inter-
venor to avoid confinement and to obtain review of the claim. One factor that cuts against
this explanation is that section 1826 was designed to codify the existing civil contempt prac-
tice with respect to recalcitrant witnesses in federal grand jury and court proceedings. See
H.R. REP. No. 1549,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Cons CONG. & AD. Naws
4007, 4008. If section 1826 merely codified the prevailing practice, it remains a mystery why
reliance on the Perlman exception mushroomed in the 1970's.
43 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
4 Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964) (quoting Dickin-
son v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)).
45 See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327-28 (1940) (appellate disruption of
grand jury process strongly disfavored because piecemeal disposition would lead to a
"leaden-footed" system and would hinder efficient administration of the criminal justice
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already are overburdened with motions at every stage of litiga-
tion,' 6 courts must respect the finality requirement if the system is
to function.
Consideration of these factors demonstrates that an inter-
venor's interlocutory appeal should be allowed only where the rela-
tionship between the subpoenaed party and the intervenor is so
attenuated that the contempt route is realistically unfeasible. 4' To
determine whether a particular relationship warrants this applica-
tion of the Perlnan exception, this comment proposes as a frame-
work for analysis the use of a continuum based on the nature of
the relationship between the subpoenaed party and the intervenor.
At one end of this continuum is Perlman, where the subpoenaed
witness has no connection with the intervenor. 48 At the other end,
in relationships such as master and servant, the intervenor effec-
tively controls the witness. "Effective control" is not a literal con-
cept; rather, it describes a nexus justifying a presumption that the
interests of the intervenor are sufficiently related to those of the
witness to eliminate the need for the intervenor to invoke the Perl-
man exception. In many situations of effective control, the inter-
venor can be expected to exercise sufficient influence over the wit-
ness that he will persuade the witness to suffer contempt to perfect
an immediate appeal." In other situations, the intervenor colludes
with the witness: the witness, who has been given information by
the intervenor, refuses to contest the order, thereby laying the
groundwork for the intervenor's argument that invocation of the
Perlnan exception is necessary50
system).
41 In 1981, court of appeals filings numbered 26,362, an increase of almost 14% over the
previous year; district court filings expanded to 211,863, a 7% increase over the previous
year. "[T]he problem these case filings present is not simply workload on the courts or delay
for the litigants, but a real threat to the quality of federal justice." W. Burger, Year-End
Report on the Judiciary 2 (December 28, 1981) (on file with The University of Chicago Law
Review).
'I In addition to showing that the contempt process cannot be relied upon, the inter-
venor must also demonstrate that delay in appealing the subpoena would result in injustice.
See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964). The alternatives,
though, will usually be unattractive. Courts have not invoked section 1292(b) to certify in-
tervenors' claims of privilege, and in any event that route is discretionary. See supra notes
27-30 and accompanying text. Moreover, although an intervenor can also protect his claim
by raising it at trial in a suppression hearing, see infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text,
this protection may frequently be too late; "courts cannot always 'unring the bell' once in-
formation has been released." Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 460 (1975). See also infra
note 57.
"See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
,See infra notes 56-57, 59, 62-72, and accompanying text.
oSee infra notes 58, 73-78, and accompanying text.
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Determining effective control is easy at either end of this con-
tinuum. At the Perlman pole, the lack of any relationship between
the parties eliminates the possibility that the intervenor will influ-
ence the witness. Such a disinterested witness presumably will not
collude with the intervenor or risk contempt to perfect an appeal
to protect the intervenor's claim, and the Perlman exception there-
fore should apply. At the master-servant pole, the relationship is
defined by the intervenor's ability to control the witness. There is
no need to apply the exception in this case because the witness
presumably will protect the intervenor's claim by suffering con-
tempt.
Relationships falling between the ends of the continuum are
more difficult to categorize. As the nature of the relationship
moves away from the Perlman pole, the need for adhering to the
final decision rule becomes more pronounced because the
probability increases that the intervenor effectively controls the
subpoenaed party, thus increasing the opportunity for collusive
appeals.
Courts can rely on several factors to determine whether inter-
venors effectively control witnesses in relationships that lie be-
tween the continuum's poles. The relationship's origin, continuity,
and duration should be considered. The relationship's ori-
gin-whether it is based on contract, agency, trust, or other
grounds-points toward another factor: the availability of sanc-
tions that the intervenor might use to coerce the witness. A third
helpful inquiry concerns the existence of any ethical, legal, or
fiduciary duties that might affect the witness's decision to risk con-
tempt. Finally, courts should consider the effect that the witness's
self-interest, such as maintaining a respectable business reputa-
tion, might have on a decision to protect the intervenor by risking
contempt. Although these factors are not exhaustive, they high-
light promising areas of inquiry for courts to use in deciding
whether a particular relationship warrants application of the Perl-
man exception.
III. APPLYING THE CONTINUUM
Using the continuum outlined above, this part analyzes case
patterns to illustrate how courts can effectively limit the scope of
the Perlman exception. Cases at the opposite ends of the contin-
uum will be examined first, and then the more difficult cases in
between will be analyzed.
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A. The Perlman Situation
Where there is no recognizable relationship between the sub-
poenaed party and the intervenor, and the intervenor asserts a
claim of privilege in the subpoenaed information, courts properly
have applied the Perlman exception. The intervenor cannot effec-
tively control the witness, and the lack of any relationship between
the parties eliminates the possibility that the intervenor might in-
fluence the witness's behavior. Accordingly, courts have applied
the exception where a court clerk,51. a government agency,5" or
some other unrelated and disinterested party"s is subpoenaed to
disclose the intervenor's privileged information. In each of these
situations, the intervenor could not possibly persuade the witness
to risk contempt to perfect an appeal. Reminiscent of the circum-
stances of Perlman itself," these cases present the most compel-
ling scenarios for applying the exception.
B. Employer-Employee Relationships
Courts typically have applied the Perlman exception to em-
ployer-employee cases by assuming, without examining the partic-
ular circumstances, that the employee could not be expected to
risk contempt to protect his employer's interests.5' Closer scrutiny,
however, reveals that this relationship lies closer to the master-ser-
vant end of the continuum, where the exception should never be
applied, than to the Perlman end. Thus a court should carefully
examine each relationship to determine if the employer effectively
controls the employee's decision to risk contempt or is in a position
to collude with the employee.
Several factors should be considered. Relations of trust and
51 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 1976)
(lawyer permitted to appeal an order compelling a court clerk to produce before a grand
jury the lawyer's retainer agreements, which had been deposited with the clerk pursuant to
a local court rule).
52 See, e.g., In re Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d 548, 551-52 (8th Cir. 1980) (corporation per-
mitted to appeal denial of motion to prevent disclosure of allegedly privileged documents in
the government's custody).
53 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d 589, 592 n.3 (3d Cir. 1978) (United
States congressman permitted to appeal the denial of his motion to quash a grand jury
subpoena issued to the Clerk of the House of Representatives to produce the congressman's
telephone records). Oddly enough, the Third Circuit never mentioned the Perlman excep-
tion in this decision; it simply assumed that the order was appealable.
" See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
as See, e.g., In re Grand Jury, 619 F.2d 1022, 1024-25 (3d Cir. 1980) (corporation per-
mitted to appeal court's order denying its motion to quash grand jury subpoenas issued to
its employees).
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confidence between the employer and employee inhere in many
jobs. In United States v. Doe,56 for example, the First Circuit al-
lowed a United States Senator to appeal the denial of his motion
to quash a grand jury subpoena issued to his legislative aide. Such
a relationship is based on mutual trust and confidence, however,
and it seems plausible that one of the aide's duties would be to
preserve the Senator's privileged communications, even where
faced with contempt. In addition, the aide has an incentive to obey
the Senator's orders if he wants to be known as a competent and
trustworthy legislative assistant. These factors demonstrate the
inappropriateness of applying the Perlman exception where the
employee can be expected to risk contempt for the employer's
benefit.57
In addition, one could imagine a case in which an employer
might order the employee to refuse to suffer contempt, thereby
creating a situation in which the employer-intervenor could invoke
the Perlman 'exception. In such a case, the employer seeks to
orchestrate events to his advantage by pretending that the subpoe-
naed employee acts independently of his concerns. The Perlman
exception should not be applicable in such sham proceedings to
avoid the final decision rule by artificially creating an appealable
" 455 F.2d 753 (lst Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub noma. Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). Senator Gravel of Alaska was Chairman of the Senate
Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds. After mysteriously acquiring the "Penta-
gon Papers," he read excerpts before his subcommittee and introduced the documents as an
exhibit. A federal grand jury was convened to investigate Gravel's acquisition of these docu-
ments, and subpoenaed his legislative aide and a publisher. The Senator intervened and
argued that his privilege under the speech and debate clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, re-
quired that the subpoena be quashed. 455 F.2d at 756.
67 The Government attempted in Doe to take the case outside of the Perlman exception
by arguing that Senator Gravel would not suffer irreparable harm if the grand jury heard
the testimony and that no injury to him was cognizable unless and until he was indicted.
The court disagreed, interpreting Perlman as requiring a court to assume the Senator's
claim of irreparable injury to be correct. 455 F.2d at 757. The Doe court has been the only
court to address this point.
This response avoids the critical inquiry involved in the Perlman exception cases. The
issue is not whether to presume irreparable injury, but rather whether the subpoenaed party
may be presumed capable under the circumstances of preserving the intervenor's appeal.
Given the Doe court's presumption of irreparable injury, every court would be bound to
apply Perlman as long as the intervenor presented a prima facie showing of such injury. To
preserve the narrow scope of the Perlman exception, courts should focus on the relationship
between the parties rather than on the type of injury alleged. But see In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 604 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1979), where the court refused to apply the Perlman
exception to allow a corporation to appeal an order denying its motion to terminate grand
jury proceedings and to quash subpoenas issued to its employees. The court reasoned that
the exception was not applicable because the government, not the subpoenaed employees,
possessed the documents sought by the grand jury. Id. at 805.
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order, when the contempt route would be available."'
Moreover, most employer-employee relationships involve some
degree of employer influence and control. 9 The typical employer,
like a master, influences the employee with threats of sanctions,
and the employee, wary of the possibility of being fired, is reluc-
tant to disregard the employer's orders. The employer also can be
expected to offer incentives to ensure employee support. For exam-
ple, although an employee might be reluctant to carry the financial
burden of suffering contempt for his employer's sake, an employer
who wants to guard information presumably will underwrite his
employee's litigation expenses and possible contempt citation. It is
in the employer's own self-interest to encourage his employees to
act as his shields. An employer who refuses to support his employ-
ees should not be permitted thereby to bootstrap his way into in-
tervention and third-party interlocutory appeal under the Perlman
exception.
" Judge Friendly, in National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 591
F.2d 174, 179 n.7 (2d Cir. 1979), recognized that the Perlman exception should not apply
where the employer orders the employee not to testify and the employee dutifully complies.
Where the employee complies with such an order, it is plausible that the employee would
also comply with other orders issued by the employer. Thus the employee might risk con-
tempt to protect the employer, or might obey the employer's order not to suffer contempt in
order to perfect a sham Perlnan appeal.
s The District of Columbia and Second Circuits have focused on this control element
in refusing to extend the Perlman exception to employer-employee relationships. In In re
Sealed Case, 655 F.2d 1298, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1981), Judge Ginsburg concluded that because
an employer exercises significant control over an employee, the Perlman exception "flags
when an employer moves to quash a subpoena addressed to such an employee."
Judge Friendly, speaking for the Second Circuit, has argued that there is no parallel
between the circumstances in Perlman and the employer-employee situation: it was
"unimaginable" that the court clerk would risk contempt to assist Perlman, but employees
are susceptible to employer control and often participate in the relationship out of which
the alleged privilege emerges. See National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile
Exch., 591 F.2d 174, 179 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1979) (refusing to extend the Perlman exception to
allow the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to appeal an order compelling em-
ployee's testimony before a grand jury; counsel for CFTC had advised the employee not to
testify, claiming that the testimony was protected by governmental privilege). See also In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 318 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1962) (Friendly, J.) (refusing to allow corpo-
ration to appeal court's denial of its motion to limit subpoenas issued to corporate officials),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 802 (1963).
In National Super Spuds, Judge Friendly suggested that where a court finds that the
employer has directed its employee-witness to flout a court's order, sanctions should be im-
posed directly on the employer rather than on the obedient employee. He argued that such
direct sanctions "might have the salutary effect of curtailing attempts to appeal from deci-
sions denying insubstantial or unimportant claims of ... privilege." 591 F.2d at 108 n.9.
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C. Attorney-Client Relationships
Courts disagree over the applicability of the Perlman excep-
tion when an attorney is subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury,
and his client, asserting an attorney-client privilege, seeks to ap-
peal the denial of a motion to quash the subpoena. Although most
circuits addressing the issue have expanded the Perlman exception
to cover this situation, 0 a well-reasoned minority argues convinc-
ingly to the contrary.6 "
Courts applying the exception to the attorney-client relation-
ship presume that an attorney cannot be expected to suffer con-
tempt for his client's sake.62 The Fifth Circuit, for example, has
asserted that an attorney's willingness to protect his client's privi-
lege in the face of a contempt citation varies greatly and depends
on the value of the client's business and the particular relation-
ship. The court has expressed "reluctan[ce] to pin the appealabil-
ity of a district court order upon such precarious considerations."6 s
The particular nature of the attorney-client relationship ren-
ders this assumption suspect. Like journalists,6 4 many attorneys
have accepted contempt citations to protect their clients' confi-
dences.6 5 As Judge Wyzanski has noted, an attorney, "in his cli-
ent's interest and as proof of his own stout-heartedness," will often
be willing to defy a court's order and risk a contempt citation to
render the client's claim appealable.6 Moreover, the attorney who
wishes to maintain a professional reputation for providing compe-
60 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 655 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 641 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 623 F.2d 122 (2d
Cir. 1980); In re November 1979 Grand Jury, 616 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1979).
"' See In re Sealed Case, 655 F.2d 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Oberkoetter, 612 F.2d 15
(1st Cir. 1980).
" See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 655 F.2d 882, 885 (8th Cir. 1981); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 641 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
623 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1980); In re November 1979 Grand Jury, 616 F.2d 1021, 1025 (7th
Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 801 (3d Cir. 1979).
"' In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 641 F.2d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1981).
" See, e.g., In re Myron Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (newspaper reporter fined
and imprisoned for civil contempt for refusing to disclose confidential sources of informa-
tion subpoenaed for use in murder trial), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
05 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding five
attorneys in contempt for refusing to comply with grand jury subpoenas seeking information
about clients); In re Grand Jury Appearance of Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882 (9th Cir.) (holding
attorney in contempt for refusing to comply with grand jury subpoena questioning his fee
arrangement with a client), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
00 In re Oberkoetter, 612 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding Perlman exception inap-
plicable to attorney-client relationships).
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tent legal services can be expected to guard his clients' interests;
prospective clients will not flock to an attorney who is known to
surrender confidential information without a fight.6
In addition to his own integrity and economic interest, an at-
torney might have a fiduciary duty to his client to risk contempt if
he believes the client's claim is worthy. 8 For example, in In re
Grand Jury Proceedings,6 the Second Circuit permitted the client
to appeal because the attorney could not be expected to risk con-
tempt,70 even though the local bar association had concluded that,
under New York's ethics rules, the attorney owed a duty to his
client to disobey the subpoena.7'1 The bar association assumed that
an ethical attorney would suffer the contempt citation, and there
was no reason for the court to presume that the attorney would act
unethically. Because of the bar association's ruling, failure to suffer
contempt would make the attorney liable in a malpractice action
for breach of duty. 2 The court's application of the Perlman excep-
tion fails its own test because there was no reason for the court to
doubt that the attorney would follow his client's wishes, especially
if he knew that the Perlman exception were not available to per-
4, See In re Sealed Case, 655 F.2d 1298, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (because lawyer shared
the client's interests in withholding the information and had a "special stake in resisting
production," Perlman exception should not be applied).
It is unclear whether an attorney would be liable in a malpractice action for comply-
ing with a subpoena against his client's wishes under the threat of contempt. The attorney's
compliance with the court's order seems consistent with the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility; Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(2) provides that a lawyer may reveal "[c]onfidences or
secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order." One
plausible reading of the rule would authorize disclosure only if the court order were valid.
Accordingly, the client might have a cause of action against the attorney if the attorney
complied with the subpoena despite knowledge that the subpoena impermissibly violated
the attorney-client privilege.
The uncertainty surrounding this issue results largely from the fact that clients rarely
sue their attorneys for unauthorized disclosure of privileged information. The few cases in
which clients have sued involve intentional attorney disclosures. See, e.g., Lakoff v. Lionel
Corp., 207 Misc. 319, 137 N.Y.S.2d 806 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Taylor v. Blacklow, 3 Bing. N.C.
235, 132 Eng. Rep. 401 (C.P. 1836). For an explanation of clients' infrequent recourse to
malpractice actions, see Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege After Attorney Disclosure, 78
MICH. L. REv. 927, 937-38 (1980).
es 623 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1980). The grand jury was investigating illegal arms sales, and
the attorney was subpoenaed to provide documents relating to his client's activities. Id. at
127. The client-intervenor claimed that production of the subpoenaed material would vio-
late his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 125.
70 Id. at 125. The author of this opinion, Judge Mulligan, had sat with Judge Friendly
on the panel that decided National Super Spuds. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying
text. Judge Mulligan's wholesale endorsement of the Perlman exception in this case is a
mystery, considering his acquiescence in Judge Friendly's earlier criticism of the doctrine.
71 623 F.2d at 124.
72 See supra note 68.
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fect an appeal. This case shows the propensity of the exception to
create unnecessary appeals.
The close relationship between an attorney and his client also
points to the likelihood of collusion between them if courts con-
tinue to allow appeals under Perlman. Where a client-intervenor
need only inform the court that his attorney will not risk con-
tempt, the "harsh choice" sought to be imposed by section 1291 is
circumvented. In In re Sealed Case,74 for example, the District of
Columbia Circuit recognized the danger of allowing an attorney
and his client to orchestrate an appeal through the Perlman excep-
tion.7 5 Judge Ginsburg's opinion argued that the client, by deliber-
ately entrusting privileged documents to his attorney, assumed
that the attorney would resist production and suffer contempt if
the client wished to secure appellate review.7 6 Accordingly, she ex-
pressed little sympathy for the client's assertion that it should be
permitted to intervene and secure an interlocutory appeal from the
court's order to produce.7
The majority-view courts also have expressed concern with the
prospect of a client suffering irreparable harm if he could not im-
mediately appeal, arguing that an attorney's disclosure of allegedly
privileged information would prejudice the client either by leading
to an indictment or by destroying the privilege.7 8 The irreparable
73 See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
7' 655 F.2d 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
" Id. at 1301. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
76 655 F.2d at 1302.
Id. Judge Ginsburg, opting for a restrictive reading of the Perlman exception, re-
jected the corporation's contention that Perlman established a general third-party exception
to section 1291. Id. She stressed that the Supreme Court has never interpreted Perlman so
broadly, and that Perlman could not be extended to the attorney-client situation "without
enlarging the exception to the point at which it engulfs the rule." Id.
Judge Wyzanski has also looked unfavorably on a broad reading of the Perlman excep-
tion. Reviewing the exception in In re Oberkoetter, 612 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1980), he
showed a subtle annoyance with the Supreme Court's tolerance of the expansion. He specu-
lated, however, that if the Court now addressed the question whether a third party has a
direct appeal from an order compelling someone to disclose an allegedly privileged matter
before the grand jury, the Court would answer "no" and would either overrule or distinguish
Perlman. Id.
Acknowledging these attacks, Judge Arnold, speaking for the court in In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 655 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1981), elected to abide by the exception because "what-
ever the merits of Perlman as an academic matter, it remains an opinion of the Supreme
Court . . . I never overruled, and recently cited with approval," id. at 884 (citation
omitted).
8 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 641 F.2d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1981); In re
November 1979 Grand Jury, 616 F.2d 1021, 1025 (7th Cir. 1980); Velsicol Chem. Corp. v.
Parsons, 561 F.2d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978).
Courts might also be concerned with the "chilling effect" of such disclosures on the
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harm exception, however, is also unpersuasive. As Judge Ginsburg
has noted, denying an appeal under Perlman "will not 'render im-
possible' appellate review of [the client's] claims."7' 9 If the attor-
ney's disclosure leads to an indictment, the client can object at
trial to the introduction of evidence based on the attorney's grand
jury testimony if the attorney-client privilege is found to be valid.80
In addition, it is not certain that an attorney's forced disclosure
before a grand jury dissipates the privilege. Waiver, like the privi-
lege itself, belongs solely to the client and not to the attorney.$1
Presumably the client cannot be held to have waived the privilege
where the attorney complied with the court's order without the cli-
ent's consent.8"
The disagreement among the circuits over the Perlman excep-
tion's applicability to the attorney-client relationship highlights
the consequences of extending the exception indiscriminately with-
out scrutinizing the relationship to find whether the intervenor can
control the witness's decision to risk contempt. Courts have ap-
proached the issue from two distinct premises. Those courts that
have extended the exception to include the attorney-client rela-
tionship assume the exception's validity and merely determine
attorney-client privilege if clients are not permitted immediate appeals, on the ground that
clients will be less likely to confide in their lawyers knowing that they cannot prevent disclo-
sures to the grand jury. See In re Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d 548, 552 (8th Cir. 1980). This
concern, however, erroneously assumes that the client is powerless to challenge such disclo-
sures in later proceedings. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
" In re Sealed Case, 655 F.2d 1298, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
80 See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966).
8, See, e.g., Esposito v. United States, 436 F.2d 603, 606 (9th Cir. 1970); Republic Gear
Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1967); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVMENCE § 2327
(J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961 & Supp. 1981).
82 See Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107, 153 (D.D.C. 1975) ("When an attorney is
subpoenaed or summoned to testify about confidential communications protected by the
attorney-client privilege, he may not do so without the informed consent of his client.");
People v. Kor, 129 Cal. App. 2d 436, 277 P.2d 94, 98 (1954) (client held not to have waived
attorney-client privilege where attorney was compelled to testify under threat of contempt
citation); Note, supra note 68, at 929-39 (discussion of various techniques used by courts to
determine whether attorneys' disclosures constitute waivers). See also FED. R. EVID. 512
(not enacted), which provides that "[e]vidence of a statement or other disclosure of privi-
leged matter is not admissible against the holder of the privilege if the disclosure was (a)
compelled erroneously or (b) made without opportunity to claim the privilege."
See also In re Oberkoetter, 612 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1980), where the court rejected
extension of the Perlman exception to the attorney-client situation because the issues likely
to be raised were easily within the competence of a district judge: his ruling was "so likely to
be fully satisfactory that in the usual case there is no public policy favoring any form of
review." Even the Fifth Circuit, an ardent supporter of a broad application of Perlman, has
noted that issues concerning the attorney-client privilege are "rarely complex and may be
disposed of without oral argument in nearly all cases." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 641
F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1981).
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whether the subpoenaed party reasonably can be expected to risk
contempt to protect the intervenor's claim. Finding such behavior
unlikely, they conclude that the Perlman exception must be ap-
plied to preserve appellate review of a deserving claim. Courts that
have rejected extension of the exception, on the other hand, as-
sume that appellate review of an interlocutory order is a privilege
that conflicts with the policies behind section 1291. They are reluc-
tant to grant appeal on the asserted ground that the subpoenaed
party cannot be expected to risk contempt, especially when they
confront the typical attorney-client relationship, where the client
exercises influence and control over the attorney's actions.
One difficulty with many of these latter cases is that they con-
test the majority's reasoning on specific factual grounds, thus dis-
guising the underlying issue: whether the judicial system can oper-
ate properly if all interlocutory orders affecting intervenors' rights
are made immediately appealable. There will be cases where the
facts show that an attorney will not risk contempt for his client.
These cases, however, which may well be the exception rather than
the rule, should not automatically legitimize the extension of
Perlman.
D. Troublesome Cases
Other cases involving a recognizable relationship between the
subpoenaed party and the intervenor present the most trouble-
some issues in determining the application of the Perlman excep-
tion. These cases are difficult to resolve because the nexus between
the parties places their relationship somewhere in the middle of
the continuum, where it is uncertain whether the intervenor can be
presumed to control the witness effectively. In these cases, courts
must scrutinize the relationship, looking for such factors as the
availability of private sanctions, the nature of the transaction, and
the presence of self-interest, to determine whether the case prop-
erly belongs closer to the Perlman pole or to the master-servant
pole of the continuum.83
Although there are no easy answers, the continuum analysis
leads to more principled and rational decisions about whether an
intervenor effectively controls a witness, so that the contempt
route to review is adequate. For example, courts should examine
the voluntariness of the transaction that initially created the rela-
tionship. If the intervenor deliberately chose to provide another
See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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party with information that might later be subject to subpoena, he
should be presumed to be barred from invoking the Perlman ex-
ception. Although this test is harsh, it would provide courts with a
precise guideline that would minimize the scope of appellate fact-
finding and would guard against collusive actions to circumvent
the final decision rule through manipulation of the Perlman excep-
tion. To shift the presumption, the intervenor might emphasize the
particular nature of the transaction, the lack of a continuing rela-
tionship, or the accidental or innocent circumstances surrounding
the transaction.
Many courts in such situations have uniformly applied the
Perlman exception, assuming that the subpoenaed party would
never risk contempt to perfect the intervenor's appeal.8' In Ameri-
can Meat Processors Association v. United States5 for example,
the Eighth Circuit permitted several members of a trade associa-
tion to appeal from an order denying their motion to quash a sub-
poena issued to another member. The subpoena sought documents
concerning each member's business activities.8 It is difficult to un-
derstand how the court so easily concluded that the subpoenaed
party was sufficiently independent of the intervenors to warrant
application of the Perlman exception. Both the subpoenaed party
and the intervenors were members of the same association, and all
of them were being investigated for organized crime and racketeer-
ing activities. Each business had a distinct interest in not disclos-
ing the subpoenaed information, because once that information
was released, all members would be potentially indictable. These
factors, when considered with the continuing nature of the rela-
tionship and the voluntariness of the transfer of information, indi-
cate that the subpoenaed party could be expected to suffer con-
tempt to protect the intervenors' claim.87
" See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Empanelled Oct. 18, 1979, 633 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1980)
(intervening lawyer permitted under Perlman exception to appeal an order denying his mo-
tion to quash subpoena issued to private investigator whom he had once retained to assist
him in defending a client); Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969) (intervenor,
as named party of a trustee account, permitted under Perlman to appeal order denying his
motion to quash subpoena issued to official of the bank holding the account).
" 561 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 110 n.2. The intervenors claimed that the subpoena, which ordered the trade
association to disclose its membership, violated their first amendment rights. Id. at 111.
S7 In fairness to the court, the subpoenaed party possibly had nothing to fear from the
investigation and might have been willing to cooperate with the government to incriminate
its fellow members, and thus the court might have been correct in concluding that the sub-
poenaed party could not be expected to protect the appellants' rights. Yet the subpoenaed
party's recalcitrance should not, by itself, confer appealability through Perlnan. The sub-
poenaed party's unwillingness is only a sign of what underlies its relationship with the inter-
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CONCLUSION
The Perlman exception is just what its name implies: an ex-
ception, and not the rule. Congress set forth in section 1291 a pol-
icy of restricting appeals to final decisions, and the Supreme Court
has recognized that Perlman represents one of a "limited class of
cases"" justifying departure from the rule of absolute finality. Yet
many courts of appeals have engaged in unwarranted extension of
the exception through a simplistic assumption that subpoenaed
witnesses are almost never willing to risk contempt to protect third
parties' privileges, thus making most cases immediately appeala-
ble. The advantage of this expansion is its ease of application. Its
flaw is that it violates the underlying policy against interlocutory
appeals.
Appeal through the Perlman route should be allowed only
where the subpoenaed party is disinterested and independent of
the intervenor and does not share the intervenor's privilege. Only
in such a case can it confidently be presumed that the witness will
not suffer contempt to perfect an appeal.
This comment has set forth an analytical continuum to assist
in assessing the nexuses between witnesses and intervenors. The
analysis, based on such factors as the origins and nature of the
relationship, the availability to the intervenor of sanctions against
the witness, special duties owed by the witness to the intervenor,
and common-sense assessments of the parties' self-interests,
should assist the courts in pinpointing relationships that are likely
to rest on commonality of interest, coercion, or collusion. In such
situations the courts should, at the least, invoke a strong presump-
tion against permitting interlocutory appeal by the intervenor.
Grounded on realistic distinctions between different types of rela-
tionships, the analysis offers a workable judicial approach to the
problem. The alternative-wholesale appealability-is unattractive
in comparison.
Michael R. Lazerwitz
venors. The relationship, especially the possibility that the interven6rs could influence the
witness's decision, should determine Perlman's applicability. Because the court failed to ex-
amine those factors, it failed to apply the Perlman exception correctly.
United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971).
